The Black-Scholes-Merton formula has been put to widespread use by options traders because it provides a means of calculating the theoretically 'correct' price of stock options. Traders can therefore see whether the market price of stock options undervalues or overvalues them compared with their hypothetical Black-ScholesMerton price, before choosing to buy or sell options accordingly. As a consequence of this close relationship between options pricing theory and options pricing practice, a strong performativity loop was activated, whereby market prices quickly converged on the hypothetical Black-Scholes-Merton prices following the dissemination of the formula. The theory has therefore had significant real-world effects, but how should we characterise the initial instinct to derive the theory from a philosophy of science perspective? The two books under review suggest that a Kuhnian reading of the advancement of scientific knowledge might well be the most appropriate. But, on closer inspection it becomes clear that the publication of the Black-Scholes-Merton formula should not be seen as a Kuhnian moment with paradigm-shaping attributes. It is shown that, at most, the formula acts as an important exemplar which, via its use in the training of options pricing theorists and options pricing practitioners, reinforces the entrenchment of finance theory within the orthodox economics worldview.
It is often said by those whose work focuses on the constitutive and causal effects of ideas that their aim is to correct the tendency for ideas to be taken insufficiently seriously. The same charge most emphatically cannot be levelled against these two excellently researched, articulately written and provocatively argued books. The genealogy of financial economists' treatment of one idea in particular is central to both books: the idea that a mathematically tractable 'ideal' price exists for exchangetraded options, such that an increasingly rigorous and scientific basis for hedging and arbitrage practices can be institutionalised across a range of different financial markets. It is this idea which resulted in the celebrated Black-Scholes-Merton formula for solving the options pricing problem.
Both books follow Peter Bernstein's pioneering lead (1992) in explaining the initial intuition underpinning options pricing theory within the history of the evolving ideas which revolutionised academic finance in the mid to late twentieth century.
Perhaps the biggest compliment to be paid in this respect is that both bear direct comparison to Bernstein's seminal contribution in terms of the depth of the analysis and the insights they provide. The emphasis differs in each case, however, from Bernstein's attempt to write a general history of modern finance theory. On the one hand, Perry Mehrling weaves the intellectual biography of arguably the most influential of all modern finance theorists, Fischer Black, into Bernstein's history of the field as a whole. On the other hand, Donald MacKenzie focuses more on the way in which the academic ideas became embedded via a performative loop in the day-today operation of financial markets.
Yet, it would be a mistake to concentrate solely on these differences, because the underlying theme of both books is remarkably similar. That is to emphasise the practical effects of modern finance theory and, in general, those effects divide in two.
First, the guiding intuition of the Black-Scholes-Merton formula has been turned into a largely unquestioned framework of thinking for subsequent generations of finance theorists. It is no exaggeration to say that the solution to the options pricing problem has been accepted as the professionalised common-sense of financial economics (e.g., Jensen 1978: 95) . Second, the guiding intuition of the Black-Scholes-Merton formula is now fully embedded in the trading strategies on which market participants rely in order to keep their businesses afloat. The solution to the options pricing problem has also been accepted, pretty much across the board, as the starting point for practitioner activity within the market environment (e.g., Derman 2004: 5-8) . No greater demonstration that ideas matter could arguably be forthcoming than to be able to show that a single solution to a single hypothetical problem has so thoroughly penetrated the activities of two such diverse communities as market theorists and market traders.
My point of departure in this review is not to question either the fact or the extent of these effects. Mehrling and MacKenzie make such compelling cases about their existence, built on in-depth interview evidence from the relevant communities, that I am fully persuaded. Instead, I intend to ask how best we might conceptualise such effects. In particular, are there traditions in the philosophy of science literature which help us to explain how a single idea can displace all previous ways of thinking about a problem and become the one accepted intellectual framework for all future analyses of that problem?
There are enough hints in the underlying commentary of both books to suggest that the most appropriate place to begin this investigation is Thomas Kuhn's classic study, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Kuhn 1970) . Even the title of Mehrling's book highlights the potentially revolutionary nature of the Black-Scholes-Merton formula which solved the options pricing problem. Moreover, the notion of a revolution is invoked in a directly analogous manner to Kuhn's specific usage (ibid: 92-110), suggesting that the professional instincts of financial economists were completely overhauled, never to be the same again (e.g., pp. 10, 14). MacKenzie is more explicit. He suggests that the fundamental shift which has occurred in modern finance theory is most assuredly Kuhnian in both its content and its outcomes. The unveiling of the Black-Scholes-Merton formula is presented as "a Kuhnian moment" (p. 139), whilst the options pricing problem which elicited the formula is described as "a tantalizingly straightforward 'normal science' problem, in the terminology of Kuhn" (p. 31).
Before this characterisation can definitely be adopted, though, it is necessary to inquire further about how Kuhn's precise meaning of 'scientific revolution' relates to his better known concept of paradigmatic thought, and whether his understanding of knowledge formation in general can be transposed from the natural science frameworks in which it was first developed to modern finance theory. As the review unfolds, it will become clear that I am tempted to go part way towards accepting the Kuhnian characterisation of modern finance theory, but I am also inclined to stop short of fully endorsing it, especially in terms of relating the origins of modern finance theory's Kuhnian character specifically to the Black-Scholes-Merton theorem.
Paradigms and Modern Finance Theory
Kuhn's notion of a paradigm undergoes significant reformulation between his earlier and his later work. In its original form, it is a radical challenge to presumptions about scientific rationalism (Anderson, Hughes and Sharrock 1986: 251) . Kuhnian science is depicted as an inherently conservative social institution, in which to be treated as a legitimate entrant into debates is to accept, largely unreflexively, the existing norms of the scientific community (Musgrave 1980: 41-2) . Under pressure from his critics, though, Kuhn subsequently backed away from this depiction, concerned that his notion of a paradigm invited confusion, due to his propensity to use it to describe shifts in the orderly way of thinking of very different scale and impact (Newton-Smith 1981: 103-4) . Kuhn accepted (1977: 294-5 ) that his original use of the concept had been overly liberal, and he latterly restricted it to just two senses.
1. One was an attempt to preserve the general meaning he was trying to capture in his original thesis: this was the uniform effects on cognition which arise in the context of socially bounded scientific communities that are controlled through the exercise of patronage (Eckberg and Hill 1980: 117-8) . Kuhn came to call this a 'disciplinary matrix ' (1970: 182-5) , emphasising that this usage referred to the regulated constellation of beliefs which a scientific community holds about the appropriate way of doing science.
2. The other represented a new attempt to focus attention on the pedagogical strategies which are deployed in order to filter scientific common-sense down from one generation of scientists to another. Kuhn came to call this inculcation of learned intuitions exposure to 'exemplars' (1977: 297-8) . He emphasised the way in which textbook learning by rote had replaced genuine reflection as the means through which trainee scientists develop professionalised habits of thought (Barnes 1982: 17-8; Margolis 1993: 7) .
There are consequently two dimensions to paradigms: one intellectual and the other institutional (Hollis 1994: 85-6) . Moreover, Kuhn is clear about how they come together in his assertion that (1970: 180) : "A paradigm governs, in the first instance, not a subject matter but rather a group of practitioners". Paradigmatic thought thus does nothing to alter what of interest might be seen in the world, but it does affect what those who are trained to speak authoritatively about the world will be of a mind to look for in it. Accordingly, paradigms are socially regulated consensus-building platforms which provide scientists with the practical instincts to guide their day-today operations (Bird 2000: 67-8) . The paradigm shifts associated with scientific revolutions therefore eradicate one expression of systematised common-sense and replace it with another. To allow oneself to become acculturated to the learned intuitions of a rival paradigm requires the "adoption of a somewhat different 'rationality' at the metalevel" (McMullin 1993: 65) . Given the leap of faith involved in such a shift, Kuhn is adamant (1970: 206) that the historical progression of knowledge is governed by something other than a "coherent direction of ontological development". One disciplinary matrix might therefore replace another, but this will be for reasons relating to the social control of scientific communities rather than to some supposedly objective standards of science.
So, how closely do the changes in finance theory documented in the books under review correspond to Kuhn's reworked conception of a paradigm shift? A paradigm shift becomes fully institutionalised at the point at which the exemplars which supported the previous disciplinary matrix are replaced. However, as the initial shift takes place at the level of the disciplinary matrix, I focus on this aspect for now, whilst leaving for later the discussion of the exemplars which sustain modern finance theory as a professionalised scientific pursuit. Four points might usefully be made in this regard about the disciplinary matrix of modern finance theory. 'the market' and not practical issues relating to financing the firm (e.g., Mehrling, pp. 10, MacKenzie, 244 3. If we suspend our caution on this point for one moment, then we can find another element in the evolution of finance theory which fits the notion of a disciplinary matrix much more satisfactorily. As soon as economists began to show a professional interest in financial markets, the development of finance theory "has something of the character of a cascade" (MacKenzie, p. 243).
Markowitz's work was refined further and turned into a fully specified model 130-1, 138 ). Yet, MacKenzie shows that Merton consciously rejected the CAPM in his approach to the options pricing problem, believing it to be some combination of theoretically old-hat and empirically wrong (pp. 134-6). In Merton's hands, then, Sharpe's CAPM had just as restricted a shelf-life as Markowitz's portfolio selection theory, which was also very quickly displaced as the starting point for financial economics (Bernstein 1992: 201) . As a consequence, the jury must still be out as to whether modern finance theory has an instant of scientific revolution and, if it does, in which publication that instant is to be found. This is a poor fit with Kuhn's notion of paradigmatic thought.
The evidence for whether modern finance theory approximates a Kuhnian paradigm can therefore be read both ways. However, up to this point I have concentrated exclusively on the 'disciplinary matrix' understanding of a paradigm. It is now necessary to turn to the rival 'exemplar' understanding, to ask whether the BlackScholes-Merton formula is of particular importance in this regard.
The Black-Scholes-Merton Theorem as Performative Exemplar
In seeking to illustrate the pedagogical power of exemplars, Kuhn emphasises the difference between how the world might look to us in pure observational terms and how it looks in theoretical terms (1970: 119-26) . Given that a process of translation must always intervene in order to impose meaning on observations, it is the theoretical view of the world which is more important (Musgrave 1980: 47) . As
Sharrock and Read argue in explaining Kuhn's position (2002: 178): "Our knowledge of the world … must always involve two elements: a contribution from the world, and a contribution from our minds, with the latter (so to speak) endowing structure upon the former". The suggestion, then, is of a radical and incommensurable split between the 'external world' of nature and a plurality of potential 'phenomenal worlds' which scientific practices first construct and then inhabit. Particular practices come to predominate, not because they offer privileged access to understanding the external world, but because they are explicable in their own terms from within the paradigmatic thought processes associated with the prevailing phenomenal world (Shapere 1980: 29; Hacking 1983: 185) .
As a consequence, the only thing which presents itself for empirical This is where the significance of the Black-Scholes-Merton theorem is really revealed. For, the strongest evidence of performativity in modern finance theory involves the theorem and its use as an exemplar for training interested parties in the art of calculating the 'true value' of an options contract. Treating the theorem as the key exemplar which unlocks the phenomenal world of modern finance enables traders to work out whether the prevailing market price of an option means that it is currently overvalued or undervalued. It does so by providing unique insights into the 'equilibrium' price which equates to a smoothly functioning and distortion-free market. Strong performativity was signalled by the speed with which market prices converged on the Black-Scholes-Merton price (Mehrling, pp. 139, 249; MacKenzie, pp. 32, 166 ).
The first fully-fledged exchange for trading options on financial assets was only established in April 1973. At that time, traders were unused to constructing deals containing options on financial instruments, so they based their decisions on ad hoc trading rules derived from specialist trading in other markets. Later in 1973, though, the academic journal articles which underpinned the Black-Scholes-Merton theorem appeared (Black and Scholes 1973; Merton 1973) . These articles provided a formal specification of a mathematically tractable guide to equilibrium options pricing and, as such, they served as the basis for an easily understandable trading rule. The result was that the theorem came to be readily incorporated into the institutional fabric of financial options markets. In the stock options market, for example, the average market price premium fell from around a 30% mark-up on the equilibrium BlackScholes-Merton price when exchange-traded options first became available in 1973 to an astonishingly small mark-up of 2% in 1978 and then again to a mark-up of only 1% immediately before the destabilising shock of the 1987 stock market crash (Rubinstein 1994: 774; MacKenzie, pp. 158-77) . This shows that traders were willing to base their investment decisions, not on the grounds of any great intuition about how the world actually works, but on the grounds of how options pricing theory said it should work. In the process, traders' activities served to confirm in practice the insights of options pricing theory.
This outcome was all the more noteworthy given that, at the time of its initial publication, it was impossible to enter the world of the Black-Scholes-Merton theorem in order to act upon its implications. The theorem relates merely to one of Kuhn's phenomenal worlds, but the multiple restrictions on trading activities designed to protect investors from exposure to a pure market mentality meant that the world which options traders actually inhabited was markedly different. Equilibrium only arises in the theorem's phenomenal world when no arbitrage opportunities remain and consequently prices are stable (Derman 2004: 6-8) . But let us backtrack for a moment, to focus once again on the origins of the formula which solved the options pricing problem. The basic argument underscoring the Black-Scholes-Merton theorem had been given many outings at academic seminars before it was physically possible to deal in exchange-traded options in financial instruments (Bernstein 1992: 220-2) . In its original form, then, the theorem was little more than a thought experiment. However, this makes it no less significant.
Indeed, in his later work, Kuhn asks whether the ability to facilitate highly consequential thought experiments was potentially the most important feature of a paradigm. At the very least, a well-constructed thought experiment provides an internal check on how robust a paradigm's major arguments are.
Kuhn is insistent (1981: 7, emphases in original) that "the new understanding produced by thought experiments is not an understanding of nature but rather of the scientist's conceptual apparatus". Thought experiments can only be tested in the first instance as a matter of logic, and it is the prevailing paradigm which imparts analytical meaning onto the logical sequences which thought experiments highlight.
Thought experiments therefore take place within the context of an existing paradigm;
they have an affirmatory intent in relation to the internal structure of the paradigm rather than possessing paradigm-creating features of their own. In Kuhn's words (ibid: 14), they are "a propaedeutic to the full discussion". This means that they act in a preparatory sense to facilitate understanding of the introductory premises of a science, as opposed to being constitutive of science in their own right. From this perspective, the initial derivation of the Black-Scholes-Merton theorem, its easy acceptance as the common-sense of both academic theorists and market practitioners and the strong performativity of its application are all evidence of its commensurability with existing paradigmatic thought in the field of economics.
The theorem today is used as such a key exemplar for finance theory that it provides significant impetus for the reproduction of the disciplinary matrix within which financial economists work. But this tells us only about the evolution of its status from its original role as a thought experiment. In that initial form, the BlackScholes-Merton theorem was merely a means of testing whether the prevailing disciplinary matrix of financial economics was robust. The outcomes of the test had a curious effect insofar as they were able to become increasingly true over time due to the performativity loop the theorem initiated via its incorporation into trading strategies. Yet, it was only the fact that the test proved positive in the first place which allowed the theorem to subsequently become such a significant exemplar for training new generations of financial economists into the habits of thought of the prevailing disciplinary matrix. It was not an exemplar in its original form, as the institutional capacity was simply not present at the time of its initial publication for it to act in that capacity. It only latterly acquired the potential to be used as an exemplar.
Conclusion
To sum up, this brings me back to the main question underpinning the review. There To answer this, it may well be necessary to conclude that the most important factors determining the practice of modern finance theory are not to be found in the realm of finance theory itself. The most distinctive feature of that theory is that it no longer constitutes an autonomous body of work in its own right. The standard procedure of finance theory is now to conceptualise every analytical problem as if the only practical task was to devise market institutions for coordinating behaviour in line with the allocatively efficient solution. As such, finance theory today explores the logical properties of equilibrium behaviour in the buying and selling of financial instruments and, in this respect, it is indistinguishable from any other branch of economics in terms of its underlying methodology. The dramatic shift in finance theory in the second half of the twentieth century, so ably documented by Mehrling and MacKenzie, at heart was a shift in what it meant to be a finance theorist. It is the story of the encroachment of economists into a previously alien subject field and their speedy appropriation of it. Thus, the search for a Kuhnian moment in modern finance theory involves explaining the increasing colonisation of other research traditions by the economics worldview.
In and of itself, the Black-Scholes-Merton theorem was neither constitutive of the disciplinary matrix which guides the intuitions of modern finance theorists nor was it the original exemplar which confirmed the shift in finance theory in line with the economics worldview. It therefore had nothing to do with whatever organic Kuhnian moment historians of finance theory subsequently want to read back in to its modern-day practices. Yet, the Black-Scholes-Merton theorem has still had Kuhnian effects, even if it is to enforce a misplaced chronology onto modern finance theory to talk about it initiating a paradigm shift in academic approaches to financial questions.
It was without doubt the most important thought experiment assisting the process of institutionalising the new habits of thought which persist up to this day in finance theory. Indeed, so successful was it in demonstrating that the economics worldview provides a robust logical basis for finance theory that it now acts as the key exemplar securing the reproduction of the new disciplinary matrix. Despite its significance in this respect, though, the Kuhnian chronology must still appear in the correct order: the paradigm shift in finance theory came first, and the development of the BlackScholes-Merton theorem followed as a reflection of the move to a new disciplinary matrix, not the other way around.
